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Abstract: Oil shocks have been often considered as exogenous factors responsible of economic downturns. In this 
paper the hypothesized exogeneity of oil prices is investigated by using running cross-correlations, distributed lag-
regressions, Granger causality tests, and VAR models applied to annual data 1960-2014 of oil prices and global 
economic activity—as measured by world GDP. Strong evidence is found that (a) the relation between oil prices and 
the global economy has significantly changed since the 1960s to the present, and (b) oil prices are endogenously 
influenced by the level of activity in the global economy. Evidence of a negative effect of oil prices on the global 
economy is weak for the whole sample and null for recent decades. These findings are consistent with former results 
using the Kilian index, which is shown to be a leading indicator of activity in the world economy. As such it is 
significantly correlated with other indicators of the global business cycle, such as the rate of growth of world output 
and the annual growth of CO2 global emissions.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Shocks to productivity have been often mentioned as the cause of economic disturbances since 
real-business-cycle models were proposed in the 1980s. The nature of these shocks remains 
usually unspecified, but oil price shocks are often mentioned as major contributors, if not 
determinant factors, to explain the recessions occurring after World War II. Hamilton has been 
probably the most prominent proponent of the view that recessions of the U.S. economy were 
related to oil shocks (Hamilton 1988, 2009, 2011). The view that oil shocks are also responsible 
for recessions of the global economy has been espoused in a recent IMF publication. For its 
authors, Kose and Terrones, a sharp increase in oil prices drove the global recession of 1975, oil 
price shocks played significant roles in the global recessions of 1982 and 1991, and in the run up 
to the global recession of 2009 they “also increased sharply (spiking to $133 a barrel in July 
2008 from $53 in January 2007)” (Kose and Terrones 2015, pp. 44-47). As explained by Kose 
and Terrones, in considering oil shocks as causes of global downturns they follow what was 
proposed long ago by Blanchard (2001). 
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 In a context of a national economy, oil price shocks causing recessions would imply an 
exogenously determined business cycle. Things are different, however, when a global business 
cycle is considered. At any rate, in several schools of economic thought the business cycle is an 
endogenously generated phenomenon of the market economy.  
 Versus the view that oil-price shocks are exogenous to the economy, determined by 
maneuvers of the producer nations, or political events like wars and revolutions, it has been 
argued that actually movements in oil prices are to a large extent endogenously determined by 
the demand for oil in international markets; the world economy itself would be only moderately 
responsive to changes in oil price (Barsky and Kilian 2004; Kilian 2009). 
 This investigation examines whether oil prices can be considered exogenously determined in a 
framework in which the unit to be analyzed is not a national economy, but the wider system of 
which all national economies are part, the world economy. The analysis focuses on annual data 
of (a) real oil prices and (b) world economic output (global GDP). 
 Figure 1 shows how strongly correlated are the rates of growth of the US and the world 
economy. In the recessions of the US economy in 1974-1975, in the early 1980s, 1991 and 2001, 
the annual rate of growth of the US economy reached negative territory. Though in these 
occasions the global economy continued expanding, in each of them the rate of growth of the 
world economy had major dips. I have argued elsewhere (Tapia 2014) that these four episodes in 
the mid-1970s and in the early years of the next three decades can be considered indeed 
recessions or crises of the world economy. My claim is that these four episodes together with the 
slump of 2009, when the output of the US and the world economy shrank respectively by 2.8% 
and 2.1% (Table 1, Figure 1), constitute five crisis of the world economy. In other terms, they are 
the most recent troughs of a business cycle of the global economy. To organize this framework 
these global recessions can be named according to monikers already in use—even if they are 
quite improper. Thus we have the First and Second Oil Crises in the mid-1970s and the early 
1980s, the Crisis of the Soviet Bloc Breakdown in the early 1990s, the Asian-Latin American 
Crisis at the turn of the century, and the Great Recession of 2008-2009. 
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 An eyeball examination of the relation between movements in oil prices and changes in the 
rate of growth of the world economy (Figure 2) does not provide much evidence of a strong link 
between movements in oil prices and the world economy. Certainly in the recessions of 2001 
and 2009 both oil prices and the world economic output dropped after having been rising 
together during the previous years of expansion. But in 1973-1974 oil prices grew at the same 
time that the world economy quickly decelerated and in the period 1980-1995 both variables 
seem to follow quite independent trajectories. As mentioned, the global downturns of the mid-
1970s and early 1980s have been repeatedly blamed on oil shocks, particularly those caused by 
the actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporter Countries (OPEC). However, no less an 
authority on oil issues as Robert Mabro wrote that “despite appearances to the contrary the 
price rises of 1973, 1979-80 and 1990 were fundamentally market phenomena although OPEC 
claimed, in macho style, kudos for the achievement and suffered the associated odium" (Mabro 
1992). 
 The analyses in the present investigation add to the view that oil prices are largely endogenous 
and show that the relation of crude oil prices with the global economy has considerably changed 
in recent decades.  Statistical methods applied to the period 1960-2014 for which data on world 
GDP are available show that an expanding world economy causes rising oil prices, as well as a 
stagnant or contractionary oil economy causes cheapening of oil. There is also some weak 
evidence that considering the period 1961-2014 oil prices have had a lagged effect on the world 
economy, so that falling oil prices stoked the world economy and rising prices dampened the 
global expansion. However, focusing in the past three decades, the evidence that oil prices have 
a negative effect on the rate of growth of the world economy is basically null, while the evidence 
that the level of global economic activity has a positive effect on the growth of oil prices is 
particularly strong.  
 In the next four sections I present descriptive statistics as well as results of distributed lag 
regressions, Granger causality tests, and VAR models; section 6 discusses identification and 
causality issues, and section 7 concludes. Issues of stationarity of the series used in the analysis 
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are examined in the Appendix, where I present results of additional analyses using series 
detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
 
2. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
During the past five decades real prices of crude oil—in 2009 US$ per barrel, Table 1— oscillated 
mostly at levels below $50 per barrel. Significant increases took place in 1972-1974, when prices 
multiplied fourfold (Table 1, Figure 2), in 1978-1979, when they doubled, and in the decade 
leading to the Great Recession when they multiplied sixfold from $16.11 in 1998 to $98.43 in 
2008. Only after the Great Recession prices went briefly over $100 per barrel, to drop steadily 
during 2015. 
 Spikes of oil prices in the years leading to a recession are the base on the common 
consideration of a causal effect of high oil prices as the trigger of economic slumps (Hamilton 
2011). But it has been also noted that each oil price spike in the period since 1975 to the present 
was preceded by large increases in the world demand for oil and “the impact of demand on the 
movement of oil prices is also evident during periods of oil price decline” (Balardini 2010). Thus, 
the longest period of falling oil prices during six consecutive years since 1981 (Figure 2) occurred 
coinciding with the only episode in which in the past 40 years world demand for oil decreased 
for four consecutive years, 1981-1984 (Balardini 2010). 
 Correlations between the annual rates of growth of world GDP and crude oil price reveal a 
changing pattern. In 30-year samples (Figure 3) or 20-year samples (Figure 4) starting before 
the mid-1970s, correlations show a null or even negative correlation between the two variables 
(Figures 3 and 4, top left panels). Then with the passage of time a clear positive link appears 
between world economic growth and change in oil prices, so that in samples including the years 
1975-2014 the correlation is positive and statistically significant. The lag-zero positive 
correlation between the oscillations of the world economy and the changes in oil prices is thus a 
phenomenon of the most recent decades. 
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 Lag correlations suggest mutual and changing influences between the world economy and oil 
prices. In 30-year samples starting before the mid-1970s the growth of oil prices was negatively 
correlated with the growth of the world economy next year (Figure 3, left mid panel). This is 
strongly suggestive that at that time increases in oil prices had a dampening effect on the world 
economy while declining oil prices worked as a stimulus for world economic activity. After the 
mid-1970s this effect seems to occur with a longer lag, as the correlation between oil prices and 
world economic growth 2 or 3 years later, which had been statistically zero before the mid-
1970s, becomes negative and, at least at marginal levels, significant (Figure 2, middle center and 
right panels).  
 Examining correlations that would be suggestive of causality in the other direction, it seems 
that world economic growth was in the past a clear stimulus for the increase of oil prices, as in 
30-year samples starting before the mid-1970s world economic growth had a positive and 
statistically significant correlation with change in oil prices next year (Figure 3, left bottom 
panel). This correlation, however, disappears in more recent decades. At longer lags of 2 or 3 
years (Figures 3 and 4, bottom row) the world economy does not have any significant correlation 
with oil prices—which is evidence against any causal effect. With a 4-year lag the world economy 
and oil prices are totally uncorrelated (Figures 3 and 4, center and right top panels), which is 
evidence against any of them having an effect on the other at this lag. 
 
3. Lag regressions 
To further explore the potential effects of changes in world economic activity on oil prices I 
regressed the annual growth of oil prices on the present value and lag values of the rate of 
growth of the world economy. Then I switched the explanatory and the dependent variable to 
investigate potential influences in the opposite direction. Eleven specifications were computed, 
including one without any lagged value of the explanatory variable, another one with one lagged 
value, and so on until ten lagged values. To be able to compare the goodness of fit of 
specifications—to choose the specification with the number of lags of the covariate that provides 
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the best fit—specifications must have the same set of data for the dependent variable, so 
dependent variable data from 1971 to 2014 were used to have up to 10 available lags (1961-1970) 
for the explanatory variable. 
 Both for models of world economic growth explaining growth of oil prices and for models of 
growth of oil prices being explained by world economic growth, the specification which 
minimized all criteria of goodness of fit (AIC, AICC, HQC and SBC) was the specification 
including the covariate at lags 0 and 1. That is: 
gWt = 3.103 + 0.005 gOILt – 0.010  gOILt-1               R2 = 0.11         Durbin-Watson   d = 1.45      [1] 
           (0.233) (0.005)         (0.005) 
 
gOILt = –25.45 + 1.38 gWt + 10.50  gWt-1                    R2 = 0.15        Durbin-Watson d = 2.18       [2] 
                (16.83)   (4.22)         (4.20) 
 
where gWt is growth of the world economy at year t, gOILt is growth of oil prices at year t, 
figures in parenthesis below parameter estimates are standard errors, and equation errors are 
omitted. 
 With a sample reduced to the period 1990-2014, also the specifications with only one lagged 
value of the explanatory covariate minimize the information criteria, indicating best fit. The 
corresponding equations are the following: 
 
gWt = 2.483 + 0.035 gOILt – 0.008  gOILt-1                 R2 = 0.42       Durbin-Watson   d = 1.61   [1a] 
           (0.235)  (0.009)        (0.009) 
 
gOILt = –25.97 + 11.27 gWt + 1.18  gWt-1                       R2 = 0.40        Durbin-Watson d = 1.77   [2a] 
                (11.40)   (2.98)         (2.94) 
 
Considering the results for the general sample, the estimated equations [1] and [2] indicate that 
the ability of  world economic growth for predicting growth of oil prices is slightly higher than 
the ability of oil prices to predict world economic growth, 15% vs 11%. But in the general sample 
oil price has a significant negative effect (–0.010 + 0.005 ) on world economic growth next year, 
while in the restricted sample 1990-2014—equations [1a] and [1b]—the significant effect of oil 
prices on world economic growth (0.035 + 0.009) is at lag 0 and positive, and the lag 1 effect is 
negative and not statistically different from zero (–0.008 + 0.009). It must be also noticed that 
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the models computed for the restricted sample (equations [1a] and [2a]) have a much higher 
ability to explain the depended variable, over 40%, than the models computed with the general 
sample, which predict 15% or less of the variation of the dependent variable.    
 Assuming zero growth of the world economy in two consecutive years t-1 and t, the oil price 
model (either with the general or the restricted sample, i.e., equation [2] or [2a]) predicts a 
decrease of about 25% in oil prices. In the restricted sample model (equation [2a]) two 
consecutive years of world expansion at a rate of say, 4% (more or less the rate of expansion of 
the world economy in the years immediately before the Great Recession), would be associated 
with a rise of –25.97 + 11.27  4 + 1.18  4 =   23.8% in oil prices. In the expanded sample model 
(equation [2]) the corresponding rise in oil prices would be very similar, 22%.  
 While the model estimated with the general sample (equation [1]) predicts world economic 
growth of 3.1% after two consecutive years of zero growth in oil prices, two consecutive years of 
100% growth in oil prices would reduce world growth to a rate of 2.6% (= 3.103 + 0.005   100 – 
0.010  100).  
 Equation [1a] estimated with data from the past quarter century predicts a positive effect of 
rising oil prices on the world economy. Thus a 100% oil price increase during two consecutive 
years would be associated with an expansion of 5.2% of the world economy (= 2.483 + 0.035  
100 – 0.008  100 =  5.183). Of course, to take this at face value would be naïve. The lag-0 
positive statistical effect of oil prices on the world economy (0.035 + 0.008) in equation [1a] 
rather than indicating a stimulating effect of rising oil prices on the world economy must be 
picking the high lag-zero correlation of recent decades between changes in oil prices and 
changes in the world economy, which is revealed by the statistically significant lag-0 effect of the 
world economy on oil prices (11.27 + 2.98) in equation [1b]. It will be discussed later that these 
lag-0 correlation and effects in regression models are more appropriately interpreted as 
evidence of causality from the world economy to oil prices.              
 On the assumption that the lag-0 positive and statistically significant effect of oil prices on 
world economic growth is likely a spurious result of causality in the opposite direction, we can 
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for identification purposes make that effect zero and compute models in which world economic 
growth is a function of just lag values of growth in oil prices. For such kind of regression, 
computed for the sample 1971-2014, all information criteria are minimized by the model with 
just lag 1, 
  gWt = -3.159 – 0.010 gOILt-1              R2 = 0.09      Durbin-Watson   d = 1.35   
              (0.225)  (0.005) 
       
in which the effect of oil prices on the world economy is barely significant (P = 0.050).  For the 
sample 1990-2014 the information criteria are minimized by the specification in which gWt is 
regressed on just gOILt-1. In this specification the effect of gOILt-1 on gWt is statistically zero  
(–0.007 + 0.012). All this is quite inconsistent with oil prices having an effect on the rate of 
growth of the world economy particularly in the most recent decades.        
           
4. Granger causality 
Using the whole set of annual rates of growth of oil prices and the world economy, tests provide 
evidence of G-causality from oil prices to the world economy in specifications including five or 
less lags (Table 2). In the other direction, G-causality from the world economy to oil prices is 
supported just by a marginally significant P-value in the specification including just one lag. 
Specifications including 12 and 13 lags are consistent with evidence that the world economy 
predict oil prices, but the fact that they appear isolated among specifications with more or less 
lags in which G-causality is rejected suggests that they are likely to be false positives (Eichler 
2006). 
 The stability of G-causality to sample selection was also tested (Table 3) revealing that for 
autoregressive (AR) orders of 5 or less, G-causality from world economic growth to oil prices is 
only found in samples not including recent years (Table 3, left panel). This is consistent with the 
fact that correlations of lagged world economic growth and present change in oil prices are 
basically zero in 30 or 20-year samples starting after the 1970s (Figures 3 and 4, bottom row). In 
tests with AR order greater than 5 (results not shown), G-causality from the world economy to 
oil prices is only found in two isolated samples 1982-2012 and 1984-2014 when AR is 9. 
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 G-causality from oil prices to world economic growth is found in basically all samples when 
the AR order is 1 and the sample does not include recent decades. For any AR order, samples 
including the three or four past decades do not support G-causality from oil price change to 
growth of the world economy. 
 Thus the evidence of G-causality between changes in the price of oil and growth of the world 
economy is mostly restricted to samples that exclude the years since the 1970s and the present. 
Since G-causality tests only consider the effect of past but not present values of the supposedly 
causal variable, this would be consistent with a causal relation between world economic growth 
and oil prices which in an annual timeframe occurs in recent decades exclusively at lag zero.  
 
 
5. VAR models  
In VAR models including the whole sample 1961-2014, information criteria (AIC, AICC, HBP, 
and FPEC) are minimized by including just one lag and no moving average term (p=1, q = 0).  
The estimated VAR equations are as follows: 
gWt = 0.92 gWt-1 – 0.01 gOILt-1 
           (0.06)            (0.01) 
 
gOILt = 3.08 gWt-1 – 0.01 gOILt-1 
               (1.40)           (0.14) 
 
With samples restricted to more recent years the VAR model cannot be computed unless the 
sample includes at least years from 1985 to 2014. In this sample information criteria are 
minimized for p = 1 and q = 2. The estimated equations (with error and moving average terms 
omitted) are: 
gWt = 1.04 gWt-1 – 0.04 gOILt-1 
           (0.08)            (0.07) 
 
gOILt = 1.85 gWt-1 – 0.73 gOILt-1  
               (2.51)           (0.37) 
 
 With the exception of the AR effect of gWt-1 on gWt, all the AR and MA effect coefficients (MA 
coefficients not shown) are very far from being significant. 
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 Impulse response functions reveal that responses are much stronger and lasting in the general 
sample 1961-2014 (Figure 5, 1st and 2nd rows) than in the sample restricted to 1985-2014 (Figure 
5, 3rd and 4th rows). Also, the response of oil prices to the world economy is much greater than 
the response of the world economy to oil prices. The fact that in the sample restricted to 1985-
2014 the responses of both variables are much smaller is consistent with the fact that VAR 
models exclude effects at lag 0, and most of the association between the change in both variables 
occurs precisely at lag zero in recent years.  
  
6. Identification and causality 
In the past three decades the annual rates of growth of oil prices and world economic activity 
have been highly correlated. For the sample 1985-2014 the correlation is 0.44 (P = 0.014), while 
correlations of each of these variables with the other one lagged one year are far from being 
significant. G-causality tests and VAR models suggest that lagged values of each variable have 
presently little ability to help predicting the other value, though they had more ability in samples 
including the 1970s and 1960s. Is it possible to interpret this array of statistical evidence in 
terms of causality and identify the actual relation between the two variables? 
 Cross-correlations, distributed lag regressions, G-causality tests and VAR models suggest that 
both oil prices and the level of activity of the global economy had a lagged effect on each other in 
the expected direction. That is, while growth of oil prices dampened world economic activity, the 
growth of the world economy was a clear a stimulus for rising oil prices. But these lagged effects 
have disappeared in recent decades in which only a lag-zero correlation persists. Is this lag-zero 
positive correlation indicative of causality? It seems the answer must be positive, as since John 
Stuart Mill it is generally accepted that the explanation of two variables being associated in their 
movements is one causing the other if a third variable is not the cause of both (Mill 1846; Pearl 
2000). But what could be a third variable causing both oil prices and the world economy to 
move in the same direction? Astronomical events? Political changes affecting at the same time 
and in the same direction oil prices and the level of activity in the global economy? Sudden 
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changes in the propensity to drive of the world population? The precautionary demand for crude 
oil has been extensively discussed as a reason for sharp increases in the price of oil when the 
supply of oil is inelastic and political events like wars or the threat of war in the Middle East led 
to oil consumers to demand more oil for being suspicious about future supply.  But for this 
mechanism to generate a zero lag positive correlation between oil price and global economic 
growth the same uncertainty should led to happy consumers expending more, or enthusiastic 
animal spirits leading to increased investment. All of which is, of course, highly hypothetical. 
Thus in the absence of a different explanation, the lag-zero correlation must be taken as 
plausible evidence of causation from global economic activity to change in oil prices. 
Interpreting the lag-0 correlation as a manifestation of causation in the opposite direction would 
mean that rising oil prices stimulates the growth of the global economy, something that is 
incompatible with economic theory of any kind. 
 The conclusions must be therefore, first, that presently movements in oil prices are 
endogenous to the global economy, and second, that oil prices have presently a very doubtful 
effect, if any, on the global economy. These are the only inferences which are consistent with the 
fact that in samples restricted to the past quarter century the response of oil prices to the 
conditions of the world economy is strong and basically at lag 0, while the response of the world 
economy to oil prices is basically null.    
  Evidence obtained in the analysis of annual data 1961-2014 in this investigation leads to 
conclude that oil prices are endogenous, which is confirmative of the analysis by Lutz Kilian, 
who analyzed the relation between global economic activity and oil prices in a monthly 
timeframe for the years 1973-2007 (Kilian 2009). Kilian created an ingenious index of global 
economic activity based on rates of cargo shipment. Since cargo shipment rates are low when 
demand for transportation of commodities is low in global downturns and they rise when there 
is more demand for transportation of commodities, and more demand for transport means more 
economic activity worldwide, a composite index of cargo rates can provide an index of activity in 
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the global economy. Kilian proved that his index had a high explanatory ability to predict 
changes in oil prices. 
 The Kilian index in both annual and monthly timeframes is indeed highly correlated with oil 
prices (Figure 6). For the years 1973-2007 in which the Kilian index is publicly available, the 
correlation between the annual mean of the Kilian index and the annual real price of oil is 0.40 
at lag 0 (n = 35, P = 0.017) and 0.56 (n = 35, P= 0.0005) when the index is lagged one year. The 
correlation decays at longer lags and with the index lagged 3 years is already statistically 
insignificant. Lagging one year oil prices with respect to the Kilian index, the correlation is just 
0.06 (n = 35, P = 0.75). The correlation of the index with the annual rate of growth of oil prices 
is 0.59 (n = 35, P = 0.0002) which declines to 0.38 when the index is lagged one year and is not 
significant at longer lags. Also, when the rate of growth of oil price is lagged just one year, it 
correlates only 0.18 (n=35, P= 0.31) with the Kilian index.   
 Using data for the months 1973:2-2007:12, the Kilian index correlates with monthly averages 
of real prices of crude oil 0.37 at lag zero (n = 419, P <0.0001), but the crosscorrelation 
increases when the index is lagged, reaching its highest value, 0.47, at lag 11 (n = 408, 
P < 0.0001). The correlation is still significant at lags of more than 30 months, suggesting an 
extended effect of the level of global economic activity on the price of oil. Lagging instead the 
price of oil, the crosscorrelation with the Kilian index decreases rapidly, and it is no longer 
significant at the usual levels of confidence when the price of oil is lagged 10 months. The 
asymmetries in these crosscorrelations, with lagged oil price (or oil price change) correlating 
zero with the Kilian index while the lag Kilian index correlates significantly positive with oil 
price (or oil price growth) argue in favor of causality from economic activity—proxied by the 
Kilian index—to oil prices, and against causality in the opposite direction. 
    The Kilian index and the rate of growth of the global economy as estimated by the World 
Bank are validated as measures of global economy activity by being strongly correlated between 
them and with other indicators of global economic activity. Though the correlation between the 
Kilian index and the rate of growth of the global economy at lag zero is just 0.23 (n = 35, 
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P = 0.180), the index correlates 0.45 with the growth of world GDP lagged one year (n=35, 
P = 0.006). This shows that the Kilian index is indeed a leading indicator of the business cycle of 
the global economy. An additional validation of the Kilian index and the World Bank estimate of 
global economic growth is given by their correlations with the growth of global emissions of CO2. 
Both national and global emissions of CO2, estimated by the Carbon Dioxide Information 
Analysis Center (CDIAC) from consumption of fossil fuels, production of cement, etc., depend 
tightly on the level of activity in the respective economy (Tapia, Ionides, and Carpintero 2012, 
50-62; Tapia and Carpintero 2013). Therefore any index of annual economic activity at the 
global level should correlate with the annual growth of global emissions of CO2. Indeed in the 
period 1973-2007 for which the Kilian index is available, the annual growth of global CO2 
emissions correlates 0.72 (P < 0.0001,  n = 35) with the rate of growth of global output at lag 
zero, while the annual Kilian index correlates 0.23 (P = 0.18) with the growth of CO2 emissions 
at lag zero and 0.45 (P = 0.007) with the rate of global emissions lagged 1 year. This provides a 
further confirmation that the Kilian index is a leading indicator of global economic activity. 
 The results of this paper raise the issue of why in an annual timeframe the lagged effects 
between world economic activity and oil prices have mostly disappeared to be substituted by be 
a contemporaneous association that has to be interpreted as a causal effect of the world 
economy—and therefore, world demand for energy—on oil prices. A possible explanation would 
be a decreasing capacity of oil supply to respond to increases in oil demand. Total consumption 
of oil almost doubled from the 1950s to 2013 (from 50 million barrels per day in the early 1950s 
to 91 mb/d in 2013) and the increase was only momentarily reversed in the early 1980s and in 
2008-2010, during two major crisis of the world economy. With demand steadily climbing in 
the long run, production in the past two decades declining in a number of major producers, and 
OPEC’s spare production capacity declining since the mid-1980s (Fattouh 2006), it seems 
plausible that slack production capacity is becoming increasingly tighter (Robert S. Strauss 
Center for International Security and Law, The University of Texas at Austin). But this issue is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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7. Conclusion 
Annual data 1960-2014 of world GDP and oil prices show that the relation between both 
variables has substantially changed during the past five decades. The evidence presented here 
suggests that analyses assuming stability of parameters for a long period are problematic. At any 
rate, results are consistently suggestive that global economic growth is a major determinant of 
crude oil prices. For the whole period since the 1960s to the present spikes and drops of oil 
prices are largely explained by upturns and downturns of the global economy, but this effect is 
even more intense in the past three decades. On the other hand, evidence of a stimulating effect 
of cheap oil on the global economy—or a dampening effect of expensive oil—is weak considering 
the whole sample, and mostly null for recent decades. These results are consistent with the fact 
that the demand for oil is tightly connected with economic activity and oil prices are responsive 
to the global demand of oil. Because demand for oil is tightly connected with the world demand 
for energy, it is also correlated with the level of industrial activity, trade and transportation of 
goods, services, and people, as proxied for example by the global emissions of CO2 or the rates of 
cargo shipment summarized in the Kilian index.  
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Table 1. Annual growth of the world economy (gW, 
%) and annual mean price of crude oil in US dollars of 
2009  
Year gW Oil price Year gW Oil price 
1961 4.3 10.16 1988 4.7 24.05 
1962 5.6 10.04 1989 3.8 28.29 
1963 5.2 9.93 1990 3.0 35.50 
1964 6.6 9.78 1991 1.4 28.96 
1965 5.5 9.60 1992 1.9 27.35 
1966 5.9 9.34 1993 1.6 23.47 
1967 4.5 9.08 1994 3.1 21.42 
1968 6.1 8.71 1995 2.9 22.58 
1969 5.8 8.30 1996 3.3 26.93 
1970 4.3 7.88 1997 3.7 24.45 
1971 4.1 9.33 1998 2.6 16.11 
1972 5.6 9.91 1999 3.4 22.44 
1973 6.4 12.46 2000 4.3 34.80 
1974 1.7 40.26 2001 1.8 29.15 
1975 0.8 36.68 2002 2.1 29.40 
1976 5.1 38.60 2003 2.8 33.27 
1977 4.0 39.54 2004 4.1 42.97 
1978 4.3 37.21 2005 3.6 59.18 
1979 4.1 77.49 2006 4.1 68.97 
1980 1.8 82.80 2007 3.9 74.70 
1981 2.1 73.84 2008 1.5 98.43 
1982 0.4 63.87 2009 -2.1 61.86 
1983 2.7 55.07 2010 4.1 78.67 
1984 4.6 51.80 2011 2.8 107.39 
1985 3.8 48.06 2012 2.2 106.45 
1986 3.2 24.66 2013 2.4 101.97 
1987 3.6 30.77 2014 2.5 91.34 
Rates of growth of the world economy are from the World Development Indicators 
database of the World Bank. Oil prices 1960-2000 in current dollars were taken 
from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, prices 2001-2014 correspond to 
Dated Brent, from www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=crude-oil-
brent&months=180. They were converted into 2009 dollars using the US GDP 
deflator. 
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Table 2. Results of G-causality 
tests. The null hypothesis in test 
1 is that oil prices are not 
influenced by the world 
economy; in test 2 the null 
hypothesis is that the world 
economy is not influence by oil 
prices. AR is the autoregressive 
order of the test model 
AR Test 1 Test 2 
1 † ** 
2 
 
* 
3 
 
* 
4 
 
* 
5 
 
* 
6 
 
† 
7 
 
† 
8 
  9 
  10 
  11 
  12 * 
 13 * 
 14 
  15 
  16 
  17 
  The sample includes 1961-2014. For AR 
orders above 17 the number of data 
points was insufficient for the model to 
be computed.  
*P<0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P<0.001, 
†P<0.1. 
   
Table 3. Results of G-causality tests in 30-year samples for specifications of 
autoregressive order between 1 and 5  
First 
year of 
the 
window 
H0: the growth of oil prices does 
not depend on the growth of the 
world economy 
H0: the  growth of  the world 
economy  does not depend on 
oil prices 
Autoregressive order Autoregressive order 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
1961 † 
    
* † † * * 
1962 † 
    
* † 
 
† † 
1963 † 
    
* † 
 
† 
 1964 † † 
   
* † 
 
† 
 1965 * † 
   
* † 
 
† 
 1966 * * 
 
† † * † 
 
† 
 1967 * * * † † * 
  
† 
 1968 * * * * † * 
    1969 ** ** * * * * 
    1970 ** ** ** * 
 
† 
 
† 
  1971 ** ** ** 
  
* 
    1972 ** * 
   
* 
    1973 ** 
    
* 
   
** 
1974 
     
* 
 
* ** * 
1975 
      
* ** * ** 
1976 
      
* ** * ** 
1977 
       
* 
 
** 
1978 
         
* 
1979 
     
† 
 
† 
  1980 
          1981 
          1982 
     
† 
    1983 
     
† 
    1984 
          *P<0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P<0.001, †P<0.1. 
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Figure 1. Annual rates of growth (%) of the world economy (gray line) and the US economy 
(black dots)  
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Annual rates of growth (%) of the world economy (left scale) & oil prices (right scale) 
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Figure 3. Correlations between the annual rates of growth of oil prices (gOIL) and the world economy (gW) at lags 0 
to 4. The dotted line is the correlation computed in 30-year samples starting at the year indicated in the horizontal 
axis, the smooth lines are the upper and lower limits of a 95% confidence band  
 
Figure 4. Correlations between oil prices and world economic growth at lags 0 to 4. All specifications as in Figure 3 
but with 20-year rather tan 30-year samples 
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Figure 5. Impulse response graphs in VAR models with the general sample 1961-2014 (1st and 
2nd rows) and the restricted sample 1985-2014 (3rd and 4th rows)  
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Figure 6. Kilian index of world economic activity and oil prices, annual (top panel) and 
monthly values (bottom panel). The correlation is 0.40 for the top panel of annual data (n=35, 
P = 0.017) and 0.37 for the bottom panel of monthly data (n=419, P<0.0001) 
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Appendix 
Some of the statistical tests in this paper rely on the assumption that annual rates of growth of 
both real oil prices and the world economy are stationary series. However, testing of stationarity 
of these two series provides strong evidence that the annual rate of growth of oil price is a 
stationary series, as for a reasonable number of lags included in the regression the ADF test 
systematically rejects the hypothesis of a unit root (results not shown). Only for very large lags 
(over 4 years) some P-values greater than 0.05 are found, compatible with a unit root. However, 
in the case of the annual rate of growth of the global economy, including less than 4 lags in the 
regression some P-values are found that do not allow rejecting the hypothesis of a unit root at 
the usual levels of statistical confidence (Table A1). Thus for instance, for a zero mean ADF test 
with only one lag included in the regression, the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected (P = 
0.105). More clear evidence however that to consider the rate of growth of the global economy as 
a stationary series is just a linear regression of the series on time (year), which produces a 
estimated slope of –0.005 + 0.01. With a t = -4.61, there is strong evidence that the rate of 
growth of the world economy series is declining over the period 1961-2014. 
 It seems therefore reasonable to test how 
robust are the results to using different 
measures of the business cycle that fit 
more astringently the requirements of 
stationarity. For that purpose I computed 
the Hodrick-Prescott trend for the series of 
world GDP values in 2005 US dollars and 
as a measure of the business cycle I used the percent deviation of world GDP with respect to the 
GDP trend. Since for annual data there is no consensus on what is the more proper value to be 
chosen for the smoothing parameter γ in computing the Hodrick-Prescott trend (Maravall and 
del Río 2007; Ravn and Uhlig 2002), I used the two values that constitute the extremes of the 
range of the recommended values, that is γ = 6.25 and γ = 100. For the years 1961-2014 the 
Table A1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for 
the series of annual rates of growth of the global 
economy, 1961-2014  
Type Lags Pr < Rho Pr < Tau Pr > F 
Zero Mean 0 0.098 0.072  
 1 0.156 0.105  
 2 0.292 0.185  
Single Mean 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 1 0.001 0.005 0.001 
 2 0.010 0.072 0.098 
Trend 0 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 
 1 <0.001 0.001 0.001 
 2 <0.001 0.020 0.022 
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percent deviation from the HP filter computed with γ = 6.25 has a correlation of 0.41 (P = 
0.002) with the rate of growth of world GDP, while the corresponding correlation is  
0.28 (P = 0.038) when γ = 100. Figures A1, A2, A3, 
and A4 are the corresponding correlates of figures 
3 and 4 in the paper when the deviations from the 
Hodrick-Prescott trend are used instead the rate of 
growth of world GDP. 
 I also computed the contemporaneous and 
lagged correlations of world GDP and real oil 
prices, both detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (Table A2). 
 The evidence of associations between the world 
business cycle and movements in oil prices derived 
from Table A2 and Figures A1 to A4 is basically 
consistent with that in Figures 3 and 4. At long 
lags of 3 or 4 years (right panels and middle panel 
of the top row) there is no evidence of effect except 
an association of change in global activity with 
change in oil prices in the opposite direction 4 
years later which disappears in recent decades 
(Figure A1 top middle panels). Also, it seems as if 
in recent decades a negative correlation would be 
appearing between the global business cycle and movements in oil prices 2 years later (Figures 
A1 to A4, mid bottom panel), but the association is just marginally significant. 
 What Figures A1 to A4 clearly show (top left panels) is evidence of a positive correlation at lag 
0 between oil prices and the business cycle as measured with deviations of world GDP from 
trend. This significant correlation, maintained in both 20-year and 30-year running samples in 
Table A2. Correlations between world 
GDP and real oil prices both detrended 
with the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
(computed with a smoothing parameter 
γ = 6.25 or γ = 100). In the first panel the 
correlations are contemporaneous, in the 
other two panels one variable is lagged 
one year with respect the other   
 
A. Contemporaneous correlations 
Sample γ = 6.25 γ = 100 
1960-2014  0.15 -0.03 
1960-1979 -0.30 -0.25 
1970-1989 -0.21 -0.25 
1980-1999  0.34 -0.02 
1990-2009  0.73***  0.65** 
2000-2014  0.82***  0.76*** 
 
B. Correlation between detrended world GDP 
and detrended real oil prices lagged 1 year 
Sample γ = 6.25 γ = 100 
1960-2014 -0.29* -0.38** 
1960-1979 -0.75*** -0.70*** 
1970-1989 -0.55* -0.56** 
1980-1999   0.14 -0.30 
1990-2009 -0.02  0.05 
2000-2014  0.00  0.16 
 
C. Correlation between detrended world GDP 
lagged one year and detrended real oil prices 
Sample γ = 6.25 γ = 100 
1960-2014  0.26  0.15 
1960-1979  0.31  0.11 
1970-1989   0.36  0.17 
1980-1999  0.26  0.24 
1990-2009  0.14  0.30 
2000-2014  0.19  0.26 
*P<0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P<0.001 
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the period since the 1960s to the present, is consistent with oil prices being endogenous to the 
world economy, but, as discussed in the paper, it is not consistent with oil shocks being 
determinants of global recessions. 
 The correlations in Table A2 provide consistent evidence that a lagged negative association of 
oil prices and global economic growth, which was apparent at lag 1 in the 1960s, is presently 
missing (Table A2, panel B). On the other hand, the lag-zero correlations between detrended 
world GD and detrended oil prices (Table A2, panel A) indicate clearly that both series, which 
were contemporaneously decoupled or even perhaps slightly negatively correlated  in the 1970s 
and 1970s, are today clearly coupled oscillating contemporaneously with a very strong 
correlation. 
 Since the rate of growth of world GDP seems to be a trended series I tried distributed lag 
regressions like equations [1], [2], [1a] and [2a] in which I substituted the percent deviation 
from a Hodrick-Prescott filter for the rate of growth of world GDP. The results obviously change 
in term of magnitude, but they are basically identical in terms of sign and statistical significance    
of the effects for specific lags. However, as it can be guessed from the results of running 
correlations, the effect of lag-1 growth in oil price on the world economy—this one measured by 
GDP deviation from trend—is not significant. 
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 Figure A1. Correlations between gOIL (the annual percent growth of oil prices) and Yd625 (the percent deviation of 
world GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott trend computed with γ = 6.25) at lags 0 to 4. The dotted line is the correlation 
computed in 30-year samples starting at the year indicated in the horizontal axis, the smooth lines are the upper and 
lower limits of a 95% confidence band 
 
Figure A2. Correlations between gOIL and Yd625 at lags 0 to 4. All specifications as in Figure A1 but with 20-year 
rather tan 30-year samples. 
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Figure A3. Correlations between gOIL (the annual percent growth of oil prices) and Yd100 (the percent deviation of 
world GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott trend computed with γ = 100) at lags 0 to 4. The dotted line is the correlation 
computed in 30-year samples starting at the year indicated in the horizontal axis, the smooth lines are the upper and 
lower limits of a 95% confidence band 
 
Figure A4. Correlations between gOIL and Yd100 at lags 0 to 4. All specifications as in Figure A3 but with 20-year 
rather tan 30-year samples. 
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